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in the street, in strict subordinance to the rights of the traveling public it
would seem to follow that if the ordinances themselves were reasonable
exercises of the police power then the placing of the meters would be a
reasonable means of effectuating the objects sought. Reference may be
made to markers of state or national highway systems," or even purely
ornamental pieces." It is doubtful whether the Alabama Court would
disagree with this reasoning although its reference to the right of the
owner not "* * * to have his property defaced by superimposed obstruc-
tions, barriers, or parking meters placed alongside" encouraged the
mention herein made.3"
PHILIP J. WOLF
RIGHT OF PRIVATE ELECTRIC UTILITY TO ATTACK THE CON-
STITUTIONALITY OF A GRANT OF FUNDS TO A LOCAL SUB-
DIVISION TO BE USED TO CONSTRUCT A COMPETING POWER
PLANT
The Alabama Power Company brought suit against Harold L.
Ickes, as Federal Emergency Administrator of Public Works, to enjoin
the loan and grant of federal funds to a municipality to be used for the
erection of an electric plant which would operate in competition with
petitioner's electric system. The Supreme Court, in affirming decisions
of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia and the
District Court, held that the loss to the petitioner was the result of
lawful competition by the municipality and as such, damnum absque in-
jura giving petitioner no standing in court to contest the constitutionality
of the loan and grant. Alabama Power Company v. Harold L. Ickes,
etc. et. al., 301 U.S. 681, 82 L. Ed. 263 (938), U.S. Law Week.,
Jan. 4, 1938, p. 3, affirming 91 Fed. (2d) 303 (1937).
The important question raised by this decision may be simply stated.
When A is injured by the lawful acts of B does A have an action against
C who was the instigator of B's acts? Several different situations are
possible.
First: If C's action in inducing B to act is lawful and unaccom-
panied with an intention to injure A, it is apparent that A would have
no recourse against C. The owner of a grocery would have no legal
rights against the bank that loaned money to his competitor whereby he
was forced out of business. Second: Where C's action is intended to
"
3Scars v. Hopley, 103 Ohio St. 46, 132 N.E. z5, 16 A.L.R. 925 (1921).
" Thomkins v. Hodgson, z Hun. (N.Y.) 146 (1874).
C Supra, note 3.
20o5COM MENTS
206 LAW JOURNAL-MARCH, 1938
injure A but the act done to induce B to act is lawful there is respectable
authority to the effect that A has an action against C. Hutton v. Wal-
ters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915); London Guarantee Co.
v. Horn, 206 Ill. 493, 69 N.E. 526 (904). Third: Where C is not
animated by an intention to harm A but there is illegality in his inducing
B to act, it is generally held that A cannot question the legality of C's
action. Thus in Railroad Company v. Ellerman, 105 U.S. I66, 26 L.
ed. 1015 (1882) the owner of a private wharf was held to have no
standing in court to question the legality of an ultra stres lease of
wharves owned by the defendant railroad that were to be used by the
lessee in competition with the plaintiff. Fourth: Where C's action is
both unlawful and impelled by a desire to injure A it seems dear that
A should be able to hold C for the damage done him despite the inter-
position of an intermediary whose otherwise lawful acts are the imme-
diate cause of A's damage. Several Supreme Court cases support this
proposition. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 Sup. Ct.
571, 69 L. Ed. 1070 (1925) the owner of a private school was held
to have a standing in court to urge the unconstitutionality of an Oregon
statute which compelled parents to send their children to public schools
despite the fact that the plaintiff had no legal action against the parents
themselves for withdrawing their children. As was stated by the court,
" * * no person in any business has such an interest in possible custo-
mers as to enable him to restrain exercise of proper power of the state
upon the ground that he will be deprived of patronage. But the injunc-
tions here sought are not against the exercise of any proper power.
Plaintiffs asked protection against arbitrary, unreasonable and unlawful
interference with their patrons and the consequent destruction of their
person and property. Their interest is clear and immediate : ." In
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529, 62 L. Ed.
i tOI (x18) the employer had a dear legal right to discharge plain-
tiff's minor son and yet the plaintiff was permitted to attack the consti-
tutionality of a federal act that would have forced the employer to dis-
charge the minor. To the same effect see Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S.
33, 36 Sup. Ct. 7, 6o L. Ed. i3 l (1915).
Into which of these four categories can the instant case be inserted?
Despite the mass of evidence to the contrary presented by the petitioner
the court accepted as conclusive a finding of fact by the district court
that: "There was and is no consipiracy between any of the defendants
and any other person, nor is there any other effort on the part of any of
the defendants to, nor are their actions motivated by a desire to, cause
injury or financial loss to the plaintiffs, or to regulate their rates or
electric rates generally, or to foster municipal ownership of public utili-
ties." If we assume for the purpose of discussion, as did the court, that
the loan and grant in question was an unconstitutional exercise of federal
power, we have dearly the number three situation and the decision
denying the Alabama Power Company the right to contest the constitu-
tionality of the loan and grant cannot be questioned.
Properly construed this decision does not place judicial sanction upon
a new means whereby the federal government can attain what has here-
tofore been considered unconstitutional ends. Its circumvention is but a
matter of adducing sufficient proof to show the existence of an intention
on the part of the federal agency making the grant or loan to accomplish
an unconstitutional objective thus bringing the case within the number
four situation discussed above. Accordingly if the loan or grant was
made under an enabling act which showed on its face an intention to
regulate utility rates there should be no question but that the person
specially injured thereby could enjoin the unlawful grant. To hold
otherwise would be to concede to the federal government the power to
control all commodity prices by the utilization of lawful competition
financed by unlawful federal appropriations.
It may be objected that Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra; Hammer
v. Dagenhart, supra; and Truax v. Raich, supra discussed above are
dissimilar to the instance case even with the addition of a proven intent
on the part of Congress to accomplish an unconstitutional end in that
the formed involved statutes that forced the person whose acts would
otherwise be rightful to act to the damage of the plaintiffs while in the
latter the government is merely inducing what would otherwise be law-
ful competition. It is submitted that this distinction is more apparent
than real. In Chas. G. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548,
57 Sup. Ct. 883, 81 L. Ed. 1279, 1O9 A.L.R. 1293 (1937) it was
implied that the federal government can gain the cooperation of a gov-
ernmental subdivision by a rebate of funds collected by taxation only
when the acts demanded of the subdivision as a condition of the grant
were related to "* * * activities fairly within the scope of national policy
and power * " *." This view seems consonant with reason. If congress
achieves ends that are unconstitutional should it matter if those ends are
gained through coercion or inducement?
GEORGE E. BAILEY
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